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DEFEATING THE BEN-ZVI, BLACKBURN, AND TSABAN ATTACK ON
THE ALGEBRAIC ERASER
IRIS ANSHEL, DEREK ATKINS, DORIAN GOLDFELD, AND PAUL E. GUNNELLS
Abstract.
The Algebraic Eraser Diffie–Hellman (AEDH) protocol was introduced in 2005 and published
in 2006 by I. Anshel, M. Anshel, D. Goldfeld, and S. Lemieux as a protocol suitable for use
on platforms with constrained computational resources, such as FPGAs, ASICs, and wireless
sensors. It is a group-theoretic cryptographic protocol that allows two users to construct a
shared secret via a Diffie–Hellman-type scheme over an insecure channel.
Building on the refuted 2012 permutation-based attack of Kalka–Teichner–Tsaban (KKT),
Ben-Zvi, Blackburn, and Tsaban (BBT) present a heuristic attack, published November 13,
2015, that attempts to recover the AEDH shared secret. In their paper BBT reference the
AEDH protocol as presented to ISO for certification (ISO 29167-20) by SecureRF. The ISO
29167-20 draft contains two profiles using the Algebraic Eraser. One profile is unaffected by
this attack; the second profile is subject to their attack provided the attack runs in real time.
This is not the case in most practical deployments.
The BBT attack is simply a targeted attack that does not attempt to break the method, sys-
tem parameters, or recover any private keys. Rather, its limited focus is to recover the shared
secret in a single transaction. In addition, the BBT attack is based on several conjectures
that are assumed to hold when parameters are chosen according to standard distributions,
which can be mitigated, if not avoided. This paper shows how to choose special distributions
so that these conjectures do not hold making the BBT attack ineffective for braid groups with
sufficiently many strands. Further, the BBT attack assumes that certain data is available to
an attacker, but there are realistic deployment scenarios where this is not the case, making the
attack fail completely. In summary, the BBT attack is flawed (with respect to the SecureRF
ISO draft) and, at a minimum, over-reaches as to its applicability.
1. Introduction
The Algebraic Eraser Diffie–Hellman protocol (AEDH, originally AEKAP) was introduced
in 2005 and published in 2006 by Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld, and Lemieux [1] as a protocol
suitable for use on computationally constrained resource platforms, e.g., FPGAs, ASICs, and
wireless sensors. More specifically, AEDH is a Group-Theoretic public-key system designed as
a computationally efficient solution for low-power or passive embedded systems and devices
associated with, among other things, the Internet of Things (IoT).
In November, 2015, Ben-Zvi, Blackburn, and Tsaban (BBT), leveraging the refuted 2012
permutation-based attack of Kalka, Teichner, and Tsaban (KTT) [3],1 published a paper [2]
claiming a successful attack against AEDH. In the abstract of [2] it is pointed out that certain
implementations of AEDH are proposed as an underlying technology for ISO/IEC 29167-20.
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The BBT paper presented a heuristic attack that attempts to recover the AEDH shared secret
in a single transaction using conjectures assumed to hold when parameters are selected based
upon a standard distribution, e.g. a special key choice. These conjectures are only asserted
by BBT, they give no indication of how they could be proved.
This paper demonstrates that the BBT attack is flawed (with respect to the SecureRF ISO
draft) and, at a minimum, over-reaches as to its applicability. The BBT approach fails to run
in real time, fails to take into account that special distributions can be selected to defeat one
of its conjectures, and assumes a certain collection of data is available to the attacker, which
is not always true.
Specifically, the BBT attack is usually thousands of times slower (on a 4 GHz processor)
than the running time of the AEDH protocol in a constrained device with limited computing
power and memory. The second profile in the ISO 29167-20 draft is an authentication protocol
whereby two users in a lightweight cryptographic setting run the AEDH key agreement protocol
and obtain a shared secret which is publicly revealed to complete the authentication. If the
BBT attack recovers the shared secret after it is revealed and authentication is completed, it
is of no consequence. Thus, the attack fails because the information is no longer relevant.
The BBT attack assumes parameters are chosen according to standard distributions. Practi-
cally, the use of a standard distribution in a commercial implementation is an over-simplification;
realistic deployment scenarios involve special distributions so that at least one of the BBT
conjectures does not hold. As a result, the attack becomes ineffective for braid groups with
sufficiently many strands.
The BBT attack assumes that all data required for the attack is available to an attacker.
As already published in the referenced ISO specification (29167-20), there exist deployment
scenarios in which this assumption is false. Therefore, there are clearly scenarios that are not
subject to the BBT attack.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the AEDH protocol. Next, in Section
3 we summarize the BBT attack, and in Section 4 provide two simple bases for defeating the
BBT attack, a conjecture counterexample and deployment counterexample. We conclude in
Section 5 by noting that the BBT attack is simply a targeted attack that does not attempt to
break the method, system parameters, or recover any private keys.
2. The Algebraic Eraser Diffie–Hellman key agreement protocol.
Let BN denote the N -strand braid group. Each element in BN can be expressed as a word
in the Artin generators {b1, b2, . . . , bN−1}, which are subject to the following relations: for
i = 1, . . . , N − 1, we have
bibi+1bi = bi+1bibi+1, (1)
and for all i, j with |i− j| ≥ 2, we have
bibj = bjbi. (2)
Thus any β ∈ BN can be expressed as a product of the form
β = bǫ1i1 b
ǫ2
i2
· · · bǫkik , (3)
where ij ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, and ǫj ∈ {±1}.
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Each braid β ∈ BN determines a permutation in SN , the group of permutations of N letters,
as follows. Let σi ∈ SN be the ith simple transposition, which maps i 7→ i+ 1, i+ 1 7→ i, and
leaves {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 2, . . . , N} fixed. Then if β ∈ BN is expressed as in (3), we map β to
the permutation σβ = σi1 · · ·σik .
Fix a prime power q, let Fq be the finite field of order q, and let t1, . . . , tN be indeterminates.
Consider the group of invertible N ×N matrices with entries in the field of rational functions
Fq(t1, . . . , tN), denoted M. Observe the permutation group SN acts on M by permuting the
variables, and we can hence form the semidirect product M ⋊ SN . For i = 1, . . . , N − 1, let
CB(bi) be the matrix defined by
CB(bi) =


1
. . .
ti −ti 1
. . .
1


, (4)
where the indicated variables appear in row i, and if i = 1 the leftmost t1 is omitted. We
similarly define CB(b−1i ) by modifying (4) slightly:
CB(b−1i ) =


1
. . .
1 −t−1i+1 t−1i+1
. . .
1


.
With these matrices in place, each braid generator bi (respectively, inverse generator b
−1
i ) deter-
mines a Colored Burau/permutation pair (CB(bi), σi) (resp., (CB(b
−1
i ), σi)), and we consider
the subgroup of M⋊SN generated by these colored Burau pairs. Since the pairs (CB(bi), σi)
satisfy the braid relations (1)–(2), the natural mapping
bi 7−→ (CB(bi), σi)
defines a representation BN →M ⋊ SN , called the Colored Burau representation. By fixing
a collection of nonzero elements, termed t-values,
{τ1, τ2, . . . , τN} ⊂ Fq,
the mapping ti 7→ τi induces a homomorphism
Π: M→ GLN (Fq).
The operation e-multiplication is the right action of the group of colored Burau pairs on the
direct product GLN (Fq)× SN and is defined by
(m, σ0) ⋆ (CB(β), σβ) = (m · Π(σ0β), σ0σβ).
With these definitions in place, users Alice and Bob execute the AEDH protocol as follows:
System Data:
• A public matrix m0 ∈ GLN (Fq).
• A set of public t-values {τ1, τ2, . . . , τN} ⊂ F×q .
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• Two sets of user conjugates in BN , one of which is public:
{za1z−1, za2z−1, . . . , zakz−1} and {zb1z−1, zb2z−1, . . . , zbℓz−1}.
It is assumed that the elements ai, bj commute, and that the conjugates are suitably
rewritten so that the element z ∈ BN remains unknown to the users.
Private/Public Keys:
• Each user chooses a random private matrix mA, mB of the form
mA =
∑
fim
i
0, mB =
∑
gim
i
0 ∈ Fq[m0].
• Each user chooses a random private braid word wA, wB in their respective set of
conjugates:
wA ∈ 〈za1z−1, za2z−1, . . . , zakz−1〉,
wB ∈ 〈zb1z−1, zb2z−1, . . . , zbℓz−1〉.
• The user private keys are given by (mA, wA), (mB, wB). It is assumed that the user
whose conjugates are public will use ephemeral private keys.
• Each user produces and exchanges their respective public keys:
PubA = (mA, 1) ⋆ (CB(wA), σwA),
PubB = (mB, 1) ⋆ (CB(wB), σwB).
• Both users evaluate the shared secret K using the received public keys and their private
keys:
K = (mA, 1) · PubB ⋆ (CB(wA), σwA) = (mB, 1) · PubA ⋆ (CB(wB), σwB).
3. The Ben-Zvi–Blackburn–Tsaban Attack
The BBT attack proceeds as follows. The attacker Eve requires access to the public keys
PubA,PubB of Alice and Bob and any other information transmitted over the insecure channel.
This includes the t-values τ1, . . . , τN , the matrix m0, and Alice’s conjugates {zaiz−1 | i =
1, . . . , k}. Let A be the subgroup of BN generated by Alice’s conjugates. Let C be the
subspace Fq[m0] ⊂ MN (Fq) of all polynomials in m0 over Fq, where MN(Fq) denotes the
vector space of N ×N matrices over Fq.
Let P ⊂ A be the subgroup of pure braids in Alice’s subgroup. In particular, P is the kernel
of the natural projection BN → SN is restricted to A. The group P determines a subspace
V ⊂MN (Fq): we take the subspace spanned by the images Π(w) as w ranges over P .
Let PubA = (p, g) be Alice’s public key, and let PubB = (q, h) be Bob’s public key. To
recover the shared secret K, Eve plans to find
• a matrix c˜ ∈ C,
• an element α′ ∈ V , and
• an element (a˜, g) ∈ 〈(CB(β), σβ) | β ∈ BN 〉
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satisfying the following property:
(p, g) = c˜ · (α′, 1) ⋆ (a˜, g).
In other words, Eve seeks a factorization of Alice’s public key. Using this data, she then takes
pure braids αi ∈ P such that the elements Π(αi) give a basis of V , and writes α′ as a linear
combination
α′ =
∑
i
λiΠ(αi), λi ∈ Fq.
She then forms the matrix
β ′ =
∑
i
λiΠ(
hαi),
where the superscript denotes the action of h in the semidirect product. Then BBT prove
that the shared secret K can be expressed as
K = c˜ · (qβ ′, h) ⋆ (a˜, g).
As an example, BBT applied their attack to sample data on the braid group B16 and with
the finite field F256. The authors successfully recovered the shared secret after a running time
of approximately 8 hours and using less than 64 MB of memory.
Eve finds the elements c˜, α′, and a˜ needed above to reconstruct K in the following way:
• Precomputation stage. Eve first determines a basis of V . Let µi = (zαiz−1, gi) be
the elements of M ⋊ SN corresponding to Alice’s conjugates, which are known. Eve
requires a method to produce elements g in SN that have order r ≤ N and that are
short products of the gi. BBT assumes this is always possible. Write g =
∏
g(j)εj ,
where each g(j) ∈ {g1, . . . , gk} and each εj ∈ {±1}, and let µ(j) be the µi corresponding
to g(j). Then since gr is trivial, the product α = (
∏
µ(j)εj)r is pure. Eve constructs
many matrices of the form Π(α) and stops when she has a set α1, . . . , αm such that
the dimension of the span of the Π(αi) has stabilized.
• Stage 1: Finding a˜. Let (p, g) be Alice’s public key. Eve again must find a product
of the µi of the form (a˜, g), that is a product with second component equal to g. This
is done using the algorithms in [3].
• Stage 2: Finding c˜. Define a matrix γ by (γ, 1) = (p, g) ⋆ (a˜, g)−1. The matrix c˜ is
then taken to be an invertible element of the intersection C ∩ γV .
• Stage 3: Remaining parameters. The matrix α′ is defined to be c˜−1γ.
4. Defeating the Ben-Zvi–Blackburn–Tsaban Attack
4.1. Conjecture Counterexample.
As detailed above, in the BBT attack it is assumed that there are many short expressions
in the publicly known Reader conjugates which are associated with low order permutations.
While this statement holds most of the time, it is not correct in every instance. At the end of
their paper, BBT indicate that it may be possible to immunize the Algebraic Eraser against
their attack by working with very carefully chosen presentations. The following demonstrates
how to effectively produce a set of permutations whose short expressions have high order most
of the time, countering their conjecture. The values of the parameter N will necessarily be in
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a higher range than is discussed in BBT, but the method can be computationally viable by
applying suitable projection operators associated to singular first private matrices.
To counter the conjecture produce a set of k ≥ 2 permutations
ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρk
in the symmetric group SN with the property that almost all short expressions (short words
in ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρk) have order greater than
αN · e 12 ·
√
N logN ,
for some constant αN > 0. The constant αN is yet to be determined, but initial testing shows
it is not too small.
Let pN denote the largest prime such that the sum of the primes less than pN does not
exceed N . By the prime number theorem, we have pN ∼
√
N logN.
We then define
ρ1 := c1(3) c1(5) c1(7) · · · c1(pN),
ρ2 := c2(3) c2(5) c2(7) · · · c2(pN),
...
ρk := ck(3) ck(5) ck(7) · · · ck(pN).
Here, for every prime p and any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we let ci(p) denote a p-cycle in SN . The p-cycles
ci(p) can be randomly chosen and are assumed to satisfy the following additional properties:
• For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the cycles ci(3), ci(5), . . . , ci(pN) are disjoint.
• For each prime 3 ≤ p ≤ pn, the cycles c1(p), c2(p), . . . , ck(p) all have the same fixed
points.
• For each prime 3 ≤ p ≤ pn, no two of the cycles c1(p), c2(p), . . . , ck(p) are integer
powers of each other.
Since the cycles are disjoint, the order of each ρi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) is given by the product of
primes ∏
3≤p≤pN
p ∼ epN ∼ 1
2
· e
√
N logN ,
where the above asymptotic formula again follows from the Prime Number Theorem.
To facilitate working with large braid groups one can choose a highly singular seed matrix
m0 in AEDH which has the property that for any g ∈ GLN(Fq), the matrix product
m0 · g
projects onto a submatrix of g consisting of r rows of g for some small 1 < r < N. This reduces
all the public keys to matrices of size r ×N instead of N2. In addition, it is possible to work
with a much smaller finite field when N is large, and, hence, arrive at manageable public key
sizes. It remains to determine optimal parameters for specific applications. This will be the
topic of a future paper.
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4.2. Deployment Counterexample.
The BBT attack requires knowledge of both public keys, the t-values, the seed matrix m0,
and one set of conjugates. Lack of any single one of these items will defeat the attack.
The BBT paper references the ISO 29167-20 draft specification of the Algebraic Eraser.
That specification contains two deployment profiles for AEDH. In one of the profiles one party
has access to a database that contains public key material for the other parties. Specifically,
in this profile an attacker never has access to one of the public keys and, as a result, cannot
mount the attack to derive the shared secret. Other deployment scenarios also exist where an
attacker does not have access to one or more pieces of data required to mount the attack. In
all these scenarios the attack cannot succeed.
5. Conclusions
The BBT attack is simply a targeted attack that does not attempt to break the method,
system parameters, or recover any private keys. Its limited focus attempts to recover the
shared secret in a single transaction for a class of weak keys. The attack is based on several
conjectures, none of which are proven. As per one BBT conjecture, when conjugate material
is chosen poorly the attacker can find short expressions and mount an attack. However, when
the conjugates are chosen with specific classes of permutations the conjecture fails as does
the BBT attack for braid groups with sufficiently many strands. Finding counterexamples of
other BBT conjectures is left for a future paper.
Similarly, deployment scenarios (such as one of the profiles in ISO 29167-20) deprive an
attacker from the information required to mount the attack. Without all required data the
attack cannot even begin.
Therefore, AEDH, a group-theoretic cryptographic protocol that constructs a shared secret
via a Diffie–Hellman-type scheme, is secure for many practical applications, including plat-
forms with constrained computation resources, such as FPGAs, ASICs, and wireless sensors.
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